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Latin America is known to be the region of the world where income inequality is among the 
highest.  Its high inequality has been invoked by economists as an explanation for its low rates of 
growth compared to East Asia, for its poor record on education given its per capita income, and for 
the volatility of its macroeconomic policies – the best-known example being its governments’ 
periodic recourse to inflationary policies to cope with political demands for greater social justice. 
1  
High inequality has also been linked to its long history of political instability, authoritarian regimes 
and civil strife. Historians attribute its high, persistent and region-wide inequality (in virtually all 
countries of the region) to its unfortunate past – in which colonial victors exploited indigenous labor 
or imported slaves to enrich themselves via exploitation of the region’s natural resource wealth – its 
gold, silver, tin, and copper – and its comparative advantage in plantation crops such as sugar.
2  In a 
typical tale of the curse of natural resources, the result:  a high concentration of income of a tiny 
ruling elite that had no interest in delivering such basic services as education and health to the poor 
majority, or in  creating institutions of government accountable to the great majority of people. 
Thus the prevailing view of economists has been that in much of Latin America, the 
economics of initial comparative advantage generated a political dynamic that in turn undermined 
the region’s long-run economic potential – and probably slowed the emergence of accountable and 
responsive democracies as well.  Or put another way: Economics explains the politics which explains 
the economics. 
But now new research by economists suggests a change. In the last decade, inequality (and 
the poverty that has accompanied it) has been declining in 13 of the region’s countries (out of 17 for 
which comparable data are available), including all the larger ones. 
3 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In this paper we discuss the possible causes – economic and political – of these inequality 
declines, and their implications for whether the trend will be sustained.  We first summarize findings 
on the decline of inequality and its causes.  We then present and discuss an assessment of how the 
type of political regime matters and why.  The latter is followed by a brief discussion of the 
relationship between changes in inequality and changes in the size of the middle class in the region.  
We conclude with some questions about whether and how changes in income distribution and in 
middle class economic power will affect the politics of distribution in the future: Will political 
changes help lock in recent advances against Latin America’s longstanding pathology of high and 
stubborn inequality? 
High inequality finally declining: economic and political causes 
Almost all countries in Latin America have high income inequality compared to countries in 
other regions (with the possible exception of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where only a 
                                                             
1 Inter-American Development Bank (1999); Birdsall and Jaspersen (1997); Sachs (1989); Dornbusch and Edwards 
(1991).  
  Engerman and Sokoloff (1997). 
3 For a comprehensive analysis of the factors behind this change, see Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010).   
 
few countries have relatively good data) – and higher than predicted inequality given their income 
per capita (Figure 2).    
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
The region’s high inequality is due in large part to the very high concentration of income at 
the top of the distribution.  Dropping the top 10 percent of households in income per capita from 
the distributions in many countries of the region would make their Gini coefficients similar to that 
in the United States (Figure 3).
4 Moreover, inequality in the region and its concentration at the top is 
likely to be even higher than that measured in household surveys, both because of underreporting of 
income especially at the top (Hilgert and Szekely, 1999; Alvaredo and Piketty, 2010) and because 
most household surveys collect primarily labor income, not property income or income from 
financial assets.
5 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Inequality did decline in some countries of the region during the good years of the 1970s, 
prior to the debt crisis and lost decade of the 1980s.  But inequality rose in the tough years of the 
1980s; Lustig (1995) reports that in most countries the share of income of not only the bottom but 
of the middle as well fell, while the share of the top ten percent grew.  And inequality continued to 
rise in the 1990s as most economies recovered (Gasparini and Lustig, 2010).  
Regarding the impact of market-oriented reforms on inequality, a detailed review of this vast 
literature goes beyond the scope of this paper. Morley (2001) does such a review and concludes 
“...that work shows that the recent
6 reforms have had a negative but small regressive impact on 
inequality  mainly  because  many  of  the  individual  reforms  had  offsetting  effects.  Trade  and  tax 
reform have been unambiguously regressive, but opening up the capital account is progressive.” 
Better management of macroeconomic policies – fiscal, monetary and exchange rate – was a good 
thing for growth and for reducing poverty, the latter since the poor were badly hurt by earlier bouts 
of  inflation  and  frequent  economic  crises.
7  But  this  consensus  is  about  the  benefit  of  ending 
inflation for the poor; on the effects of the Washington Consensus policies on inequality there is less 
agreement. .   
The decline in inequality across most countries since the early 2000s thus has the markings 
of a breakthrough.  The decline has been measurable and substantial in economic terms in at least 
ten countries with different political systems and styles and approaches to social policy – including 
                                                             
4 According to the Inter-American Development Bank (1999), the Gini for 90 percent of the population in Latin 
America would be, on average, only 0.36 instead of 0.52, and in six countries income inequality would be less than that 
of the United States. The Gini coefficient takes values between zero (no inequality at all) and one (maximum inequality).  
Measured at the country level, Ginis tend to be between .25 (Sweden) and .60 (Brazil and South Africa).  The Gini 
coefficient in the United States was about 0.34 in 1996.    
5 Household data on wealth are rare for countries in Latin America and other developing countries. The distribution of 
wealth is everywhere more unequal than the distribution of income (Davies et al., 2006). 
6 Recent here refers to the 1980s and 1990s, depending on the country. 
7 On effects of macroeconomic policies on the poor via crises, see Lustig (2000).    
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.  Inequality declined in 
countries that enjoyed high growth thanks to a benign external environment (with higher 
commodity prices and lower interest rates) such as Argentina, Chile and Peru and in countries where 
economic growth was lackluster such as Brazil and Mexico.
8  
As shown in the country studies for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru included in Lopez-
Calva and Lustig (2010),  two key factors have mattered: the decline in the premium to skills (in 
effect to higher education
9) and more active and progressive social policies including targeted 
spending in the four countries (in particular, in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) benefiting a large 
proportion (as high as two thirds in Mexico
10) of households at the bottom of the income 
distribution (households with income per capita below US$2.50 a day).
11 The decline in the premium 
to skills seems to be mainly the result of the expansion of basic education during the last couple of 
decades;
12 it might also be a consequence of the petering out of the one-time unequalizing effect of 
skill-biased technical change in the 1990s associated with the opening up of trade and investment. In 
any case, in the race between skill-biased technical change and educational upgrading, in the past ten 
years the latter has taken the lead.
13   
In some ways those are proximate causes of the decline; non-economists might justifiably 
ask about the political dynamics underlying the greater access to higher levels of education and the 
progressive social policies.   
Consider first education.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) notes that in the mature Western 
economies, the expansion of education in the 19
th century followed democratization and its 
consolidation (Lindert and Williamson, 2001 and Lindert, 2004, make that case for the United 
States).  Of course democratization in currently advanced economies can also be associated with 
other changes that have not historically been associated with inequality decline in Latin America, 
such as increases in the share of wages in national income (which Rodrik, 1997 shows tend to follow 
democratization), and the creation of labor market institutions including unions that are associated 
with that rise in wage share.
14 In contrast, in the cases of Mexico and Peru, the decline in inequality 
has coincided with a period of weakening labor market institutions.   
                                                             
8 Brazil and Mexico’s per capita GDP growth rate until 2007 were below 3 percent. 
9 On the extraordinary rise in the wage premium to higher education in Latin America in the 1990s, see Behrman, 
Birdsall and Szekely (2007). 
10 See Lustig, Pessino and Scott (2011). 
11 For more on economic causes, see Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010) and the contributors to the volume Declining 
Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?   
12 Basic education includes grades 1–9 in Argentina and Mexico; 1–8 in Brazil; and 1–11 in Peru. The number of grades 
includes what countries call basic primary and secondary education. 
13 Tinbergen (1975) was among the first to use this expression and, more recently, it was the central theme of Goldin 
and Katz’s illuminating analysis of the United States (Goldin and Katz 2008).  
14 Latin America has had active unions, especially in the public sector, but these have tended to increase the dual 
structure of the labor market, leaving those in the informal sector farther behind and increasing wage inequality overall. 
In the cases of Mexico and Peru, the decline in inequality coincided with a period of weakening labor market institutions.  
However, the decline in inequality in Argentina may well be the result of a pro-union/pro-disenfranchised government 
stance at least in part (Pages et al, 2008).    
 
At the same time, it may be that what political scientists refer to as “consolidated 
democracy” is still far off in much of Latin America – including Peru, Bolivia, and certainly 
Guatemala.   Instead increasing access to education, at least at the primary and secondary level, 
could be viewed as a long-term trend common throughout the region and indeed throughout the 
developing world. That would suggest that it is not primarily democratization that increased 
education (indeed the increasing trend persisted during the 1980s military period in Brazil, Chile and 
Argentina) but the participation of Latin America in a worldwide trend reflecting changing global 
norms in the post-World War II period.  In terms of increasing access to schooling, Latin America 
has not been, over the past 50 years, exceptional; until 1995, schooling increased faster and 
schooling inequality declined faster in less democratic Asia and even in Africa’s weak democracies, 
schooling access has increased remarkably in the post-war era (Clemens, 2004).  In Brazil and 
Mexico, there was a push for basic education especially in the second half of the 1990s and in 
Mexico, between 1992 and 2002 spending per primary school student rose by 63 percent. 
15  In 
addition to “enlightened leadership,” this big push for education was possible because of the 
demographic transition: fewer and fewer children have been entering into primary school because of 
how the age pyramid has been shifting. However, those who benefited from the new priority on 
education are of course only now becoming adults and entering the labor force, so any effect on 
wage inequality of resulting shifts in returns to skills is in the future.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
What about the political dynamics behind the targeted transfer programs?  The first large-
scale of these began in Mexico in the late 1990s with PROGRESA (later called Oportunidades) and 
spread to other countries later in that decade and especially in the 2000s.  Robinson (2010) asserts 
that “the spread of programs such as PROGRESA in Mexico is clearly related to the 
democratization that took place in the 1990s, which shifted political power away from corporatist 
groups like labor unions toward rural voters”, citing Scott 2008. He also suggests this and other 
redistribution programs are more likely where the poor beneficiaries for one reason or another 
become politically organized – so that even where clientelism still dominates (i.e. democracy is still 
not fully institutionalized)  politics begins to benefit them directly.  He contrasts the situation after 
the year 2000 in Brazil and Bolivia to that in Guatemala.  The redistribution program Bolsa Familia 
in Brazil was instituted nation-wide when a political party reliant on votes by the rural as much as 
urban poor, the PT (party of workers) under the leadership of Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva won the 
2000 presidential election.  (It was a PT governor that started such a program in the federal district 
of Brasilia in the 1990s.)  In Bolivia, policies of redistribution took hold in 2005 when the rural party 
movement (the MAP) led to the election of Evo Morales.  Political parties are, in short, critical in 
allowing the poor to solve the collective action problem they face in being adequately represented; 
otherwise even where they are a clear majority of citizens and even of voters, they will not influence 
policies that affect the distribution of income.    
                                                             
15 Esquivel et al. (2010) Spending for tertiary education also rose, but for the first time in the 1990s, it rose less than 
spending for basic (primary and secondary) education.   
 
In short, a long-run increase in access to education which finally, as the supply of educated 
workers began to catch up with demand  brought down what had been high returns to those most 
skilled; growth in some of the countries (even though still heavily commodity-based);  and more 
progressive government spending came together after the year 2000 to reduce longstanding 
inequality.
16 In a number of countries (but not in all) the new influence of political parties 
representing the poor may be what explains this shift in government spending -- these came 
together after the year 2000 to reduce longstanding inequality in most countries of the region.  
But we also want to suggest there is more to the story. 
Declining inequality and leftist regimes: What really matters?  
Inequality declines in the region coincided with the election of leftist regimes starting with 
the 1999 election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and the 2000 victory of Ricardo Lagos in Chile.  
These elections were followed by 2003 victories of Néstor Kirchner in Argentina and Luiz Inácio 
“Lula” da Silva in Brazil.  This swing to left was repeated in Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Nicaragua where candidates promising a radical break with past neoliberal policies won elections in 
2006 and 2007. And it continued in Paraguay (2008) and El Salvador (2009).This section reviews the 
criteria political scientists and economists have used to distinguish populist from non populist new 
Latin left regimes and provides some evidence of the efficacy and sustainability of redistributive 
policies.   
 
The regimes classified as “new left” have accumulated some 34 effective policy years across 
eight countries, governing at one point about 2/3 of the region’s population.  Using the consistent 
survey based inequality estimates prepared by SEDLAC for 18 countries in the region covering the 
period from 1988 to 2008, we evaluate inequality changes for three political regime groups: left 
populist, social democratic and non-left governments,
17 focusing mainly on public social spending 
on transfers, education and health
18 as both a measure of political will and as a key redistributive 
mechanism.
19 Our analysis builds on Lustig and McLeod (2009) and McLeod and Lustig (2010), who 
show that both types of left regimes boosted social spending and reduced inequality during the 
decade ending in 2009, especially compared to the non-left regimes. However, the left populist 
group led by Argentina and Venezuela has largely just managed to bring inequality down to pre-crisis 
                                                             
16 See Barros et al. (2010), Esquivel et al. (2010), Gasparini and Cruces (2010a, 2010b), Gray-Molina and Yañez (2009), 
Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010).  
    The populist left regimes include Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela; the social democratic left 
include Brazil, Chile and Uruguay; the non-left countries include Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. The classification by regime type is based on 
Arnson and Perales (2007). (See also Table 1) We are not political scientists and make no explicit claims ourselves about 
the classifications. In the regression analysis, the populist left is comprised of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. Note that in the econometric analysis, Nicaragua is included among the non-left regimes because the 
available data end in 2006, before the leftist government took power.  The same applies to El Salvador and Paraguay 
where the available data do not correspond to when the left took power.    
18 As estimated and assembled by CEPAL (Gasto Público Social).  
   We rely on the excellent standardized survey based inequality estimates assembled by SEDLAC (Socio-economic 
Database for Latin American and the Caribbean, CEDLAS and the World Bank) 1989 to 2008. sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar   
 
levels. Brazil and Chile on the other hand lowered inequality to historic lows during this period, 
lowering their respective Gini coefficients by a full six and three percentage points, respectively (see 
Figure 5 below).  In addition, though macroeconomic indicators of external and internal balance of 
all the Latin America’s new left regimes are benign by historical standards, since 2007 inflation in 
Argentina and Venezuela has risen into double digits fueled by a rapid expansion of domestic credit, 
perhaps an early indication of unsustainable redistributive policies.      
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5] 
 
Table 1 classifies the various “new left” regimes that have come to power in Latin America 
since the turn of the century.  Though a common denominator in the rhetoric of these regimes was 
rejection of previous “neoliberal” or market oriented policy regimes, over time differences emerged 
in the methods and economic policies of these regimes.  Kaufman (2007) distinguishes between “… 
parties that combine distributive goals with market oriented policies and those advocating a return 
to more traditional forms of state control and economic nationalism”.
20  Dornbusch and Edwards 
(1991) famously characterize “economic populism’ as “…an approach to economics that emphasizes 
growth and income distribution and deemphasizes the risks of inflation and deficit finance, external 
constraints, and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive nonmarket policies.” (p. 9) Similarly, 
Edwards (2009) argues that left governments in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have found a way to 
marry laudable redistributive policies with sustainable market oriented economic policies, while the 
“left populist” regimes listed in Table 1 have not. Over time Edwards (2009) argues this difference 
will be manifested in slower growth and ultimately ineffective redistributive policies.
21 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
From a political point of view, the fear is that the left populist regimes have become too 
sustainable, tampering with institutions and electoral systems in ways that work to extend their hold 
on power indefinitely.  Arnson and Perales (2007) for example note that in Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay “left parties have moderated over time and participate fully in stable, competitive electoral 
systems”, while under populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador , Nicaragua and Venezuela  
the “political system is ‘refounded’  via new constitutions that strengthen the executive at the 
expense of checks and balances” and where the political discourse is highly polarizing between ´the 
people´ and an oligarchic elite. And where “new forms of political participation are created outside 
traditional institutions, such as parties, and are linked to the president in corporatist fashion,  the 
state intervenes in the economy in ways that are hostile to private capital, etc.  Similarly, Roberts, 
Bethell and Mayorga (2007) see the social democratic regimes of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay as “the 
maturation of democracy” but see recent political developments in Venezuela and Bolivia as “not 
the maturation of democracy, but rather its crisis: namely, the failure of representative democratic 
                                                             
20 Kaufman cites p.24 in Arnson and Perales, 2007. 
21 Edwards (2009) also classifies Alan Garcia’s regime in Peru as social democratic; others might reasonably classify  
Fernandez’ regime in Dominican Republic as social democratic.      
 
institutions to respond effectively to social needs and demands.”  In “Argentina, Peru, Venezuela 
and Bolivia populist or leftist leaders operate in political systems where opposition parties have 
virtually evaporated, and representative institutions are struggling to rebuild.”  Similarly, Acemoglu 
et al. (2010) see the rise of left populist governments with charismatic leaders and “left of median 
voter” policies as a response of electorates that are convinced that corruption and existing checks 
and balances allow elites to capture governments thereby preventing promised redistribution toward 
the middle class: voters choose radical populist leaders precisely because they promise to dismantle 
traditional checks and balances.   
 
There is some evidence that the new century’s left regimes (both types) have reduced 
inequality in Latin America more than non-left regimes (see Lustig and McLeod, 2009; Cornia, 2010; 
and, McLeod and Lustig, 2010), and that within  the left regimes, that it is the social democratic 
regimes that have done better.  Table 2 presents estimates from Lustig and McLeod (2009) using the 
cumulative years in power index for each regime presented in Table 1.  The key result is that though 
both regimes reduced inequality and poverty during the past decade, once one controls for 
unobserved factors (fixed effects) or initial levels of inequality, only the social democratic regimes 
appear to break with the past, reducing inequality to historic lows.     
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
What made the difference between the two types of leftist regimes?  An obvious possibility 
is their macroeconomic policies.  Columns II and III of Table 2 suggest that underlying factors 
associated with left populist regimes, including higher inflation, may underlie their lesser success in 
policy terms in reducing inequality.  But the differences in key macroeconomic indicators between 
the two types of leftist regimes have not been all that great in the last decade. Inflation though 
higher since 2000 in the populist regimes, has been far below rates in the 1980s (Appendix Table 
A.1). (Inflation in the social democratic regimes has been even lower than in the non-leftist regimes; 
the social democratic left has been conservative not only relative to the past but relative to the right.)   
The populist left regimes enjoyed better terms of trade and also had higher fuel exports as a percent 
of merchandise trade. But as with inflation the differences are not dramatic – except possibly for 
Argentina and Venezuela in just the last couple of years.  For much of the decade, left populist 
regimes ran healthy primary surpluses (though lower than in social democratic regimes) and they 
managed to reduce their external debt to GDP ratios to below 20 percent.
22 As a result it is hard to 
attribute the differences in the success of the two types of leftist regimes in reducing inequality 
primarily to differences in their macroeconomic policies – at least up to now. (Of course to the 
extent these favorable conditions constitute an ongoing boom the question is whether the growth 
and inequality reduction (and poverty reduction) the populist regimes have enjoyed can be sustained 
if and when those conditions change).
23   
                                                             
22 Appendix Table A-1.  
23 The classic populist response to favorable terms of trade is external borrowing and capital inflows which make a 
boom unsustainable.  In early 2010 there is little evidence of excessive external borrowing or capital inflows.   
 
More important than macroeconomic indicators to explain the difference between the two 
types of leftist regimes are two other factors. First have been changes in social policy, including 
social spending.  Cornia (2010) suggests that a wide range of social and redistributive policies, 
ranging from social spending to minimum wage increases, have reduced inequality in all countries. 
Have the two different types of left regimes been different in their social and other redistributive 
programs and policies?  Figure 6 portrays estimates by the two types of left regimes of the annual 
redistribution of household income across quintiles in the last two decades.
24  These estimates show 
much greater redistribution from richer to poorer in the social democratic regimes.  Social 
democratic regimes basically ignore the fourth quintile, whose income share is remarkably constant, 
but redistribute about 0.4 percent of GDP each year in office from the top quintile to the bottom 
three quintiles.  For the left populist regimes there has not been much change in the quintile shares 
from in the early 1990s, (though there is certainly improvement compared to the crisis years of the 
late 1990s (2001 in Argentina)). This result is not consistent with the usual characterization (e.g. 
Acemoglu et al.) of populist political movements as “left of the median voter” policy regimes, 
implying the poorest groups may benefit most (and this is certainly the rhetoric of left regimes).     
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 AND 7] 
 
What was the role of social policy in the social democratic regimes in effecting this greater 
redistribution? There is considerable evidence from household surveys that education expenditures 
and conditional cash transfer programs have reduced inequality and poverty.  Is that what mattered 
at the national level, and more so in the social democratic regimes? As Table 2 above indicates, 
public social spending had an equalizing effect in the region overall (and total government spending 
a disequalizing effect).
25  But our sample by regime type is too small to directly estimate differential 
effects of social and other spending.  To address the question, we first plot changes in social 
spending (as a share of GDP) for the three types of regimes, focusing on the early and largest social 
democratic and left populist regimes in Figure 7. Both Chile and Brazil (mainly the latter) increased 
public spending on transfers, education and health
26 during this period, according to CEPAL.  
Though data for Venezuela are not available after 2006, the left populist regimes also allocated 
considerably more than non-left governments to social spending but less than the social democratic 
regimes.  
   
We then do fixed effects estimates of changes in the share of social spending in total 
government spending across quintiles for the period 1990-2008, this time by type of regime (Figure 
                                                             
   See also Appendix Table A-Z. 
   Social spending was greater in social democratic than populist left regimes throughout the past decades (and greater 
than in non-left regimes), but so was overall government spending – with presumably offsetting effects on inequality in 
each regime. Appendix Table A-1.  
26 As estimated and assembled by CEPAL (Gasto Público Social) available at http://www.eclac.org/.    
 
8).
27  Social spending is progressive across all regime types, but is most progressive in the social 
democratic regimes, with redistribution again (as with overall income) from the top to the bottom 
three quintiles.  This result is consistent with both spending on cash transfers targeted to the poor in 
the bottom quintile, but also with greater increases in spending on health and education that reach 
the lower and middle quintiles (probably in most countries compared to changes in the proportion 
spent on pensions), and within those sectors, probably greater increases on basic services – in 
education with greater increases in spending on primary and secondary schooling than on public 
universities. 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE] 
The second factor by which the two types of leftist regimes differ sharply is in indicators of 
transparency and government effectiveness (including as viewed by outside investors). One example 
is the understatement of Argentina’s inflation by its official agency (INDEC). In 2007 several staff 
members of INDEC were fired and for the next three years Argentina’s official inflation rate 
stabilized at about 8 percent, while other estimates (e.g. the independent FIEL) put inflation over 20 
percent in 2008-2010 (see below).
28  And of the five left populist regimes only Venezuela reports its 
primary deficit to the IMF.   
Differences in transparency are not well measured across countries.  However there are 
various measures of government effectiveness. Figure 9 reflects the scores of countries in the region 
by regime type reported by Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008) – in turn based on views 
expressed within countries by measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies through surveys of a range of stakeholders (firms, individuals, NGOs, commercial risk 
rating agencies, multilateral aid agencies, and other public sector organizations).   The left populist 
regimes are rated considerably below the non-left regimes, and the social democratic regimes are 
rated well above.
29 Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are considered more effective governments overall. 
[INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE] 
Finally we ask whether the reductions in inequality in the new left regimes of Latin America 
are permanent or transitory?   Historically, populist policies have been financed by favorable terms 
of trade shifts that provide the public revenues needed to finance redistributive programs (until the 
commodity price boom ends).
30  The current era is no exception.  As shown in Figure 10, terms of 
trade have treated both the populist and social democratic regimes well, especially compared to 
other non-left Latin countries. (Appendix Table A-1). Chile and Venezuela experienced the most 
                                                             
27 The regression on which the figure is based is shown in Appendix Table A-2. 
28 The IMF prints Argentina’s official inflation with a footnote saying private estimates put inflation considerably higher, 
and recently Argentina asked for and is getting technical assistance from the IMF at INDEC. 
29  A similar assessment from Moody’s tells a similar story (available from the authors).  Moody’s is not, of course an 
unbiased observer of Latin regimes but whatever its bias there are real consequences in terms of lower credit ratings. 
   The classic example is first Peron regime in the early 1950s, Dornbusch and Edwards (1991).     
 
dramatic improvements in their terms of trade, as high petroleum and copper prices added directly 
to government revenues.   The improvements in Brazil’s terms of trade have been more modest, as 
shown with the population-weighted terms of trade index, dominated by Brazil (Argentina and 
Venezuela are similar in size so the population-weighted terms of trade index is not much different 
than the simple average shown in Figure 10 (and Appendix Table A-1).  Improvements in the terms 
of trade have had a progressive impact at least in the short term, but cannot explain much of Brazil’s 
reduction in equality; as shown in Table 2, controlling for the terms of trade it is the political regime 
that made a difference.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 10]  
 
Apart from transient commodity price booms, what can make redistribution unsustainable 
are macroeconomic imbalances, particularly the accumulation of internal public sector or external 
debt.  In this regard both types of left regimes have been relatively conservative, paying down 
external debt (see Table A-1) and avoiding large fiscal deficits (in fact by most measures the social 
democratic regimes have been more conservative that non-left regimes, perhaps as a way to boost 
their credibility with the private sector).  A worrisome trend, however, is the recent expansion of 
domestic credit and the recent double digit rates of inflation in Argentina and Venezuela.  In the 
short term, inflation can undermine efforts to redistribute income as the inflation tax is regressive 
(we present some evidence of this below). Over the longer term high inflation fueled by domestic 
credit growth can lead to exchange rate appreciation and capital flight, though at the moment both 
countries are running current account surpluses (due in part to high commodity prices).    
 
In short, during the first decade of the 21
st century, our econometric evidence suggests that 
though inequality fell in most leftist regimes, those with left populist governments were more likely 
to benefit from good luck than good policy, including increases in the prices of oil and other 
commodities, while those with social democratic regimes reduced inequality more than they would 
have otherwise because of good policy – including effective redistribution programs.  The difference 
does not appear to have been dramatically better macroeconomic management, at least as reflected 
in traditional indicators. We do not have enough data over enough periods to estimate directly the 
impact of inflation, government spending and other variables on inequality for each of the three 
regime types.  But the descriptive data suggest the differences between the two leftist regime types as 
measured by traditional macro indicators have until very recently been small  – perhaps because the 
external environment has made reasonably “good macro” relatively easy.  
Instead the difference between the two types of regimes appears to have more to do with the 
elusive quality of “government effectiveness” as seen by observers, including in the type of and 
management (not the amount) of social spending.  On that score it could be observers (particularly 
private investors) are noting the success of Chile in adhering to its fiscal rules and the political 
support for Lula’s inflation fighting in Brazil; but it also could be that the social democratic 
governments are also seen as more efficient and effective as managers of social and other 
expenditure programs.     
 
It would be ironic if governments in Latin America were more successful in reducing 
inequality because they are more effective at managing such social programs as conditional cash 
transfers – and are simultaneously viewed as more reliable and business-friendly. At the same time, 
insofar as private investors also view macroeconomic stability as a key indicator of government 
effectiveness, it appears that the inequality declines in the social democratic regimes are more likely 
to be sustained in the future than the declines in the populist regimes. 
 
 Declining Inequality, the Middle Class and Politics  
 How might changes in the size and economic command of the middle class change the 
politics of distribution in Latin America? Might the history of political power being controlled by a 
landed elite and industrialists with little interest in expanding economic opportunity change where 
the middle class is growing, at least in democratic regimes? Where clientelist politics have led to 
populist economic programs, consistent with median voter theory, might a larger middle class 
encourage more fiscally sustainable while still stable and progressive policies?  
Birdsall (2010) defines a global middle class in income terms across both advanced and 
developing countries as those households with income per capita of at least $10 (2005 PPP terms) 
who are not among the richest 5 percent in their own country. This “indispensable” middle class is 
likely to demand capable and accountable government and economic policies conducive to market-
led growth.  
The relatively high $10 floor means that in developing countries the global middle class 
tends to be concentrated in the top quintiles of the income distribution.  In the lowest-income 
countries, for example in Africa, by this definition there was no middle class at all in 2005—all 
households enjoying per capita income of at least $10 were in the excluded top 5 per cent of the 
income distribution.  
In Latin America, the middle class so defined consists entirely of households in the top 
quintile in all countries studied, except Mexico, urban Argentina, and Chile (Figure 11).   
[INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE] 
By this definition, the size of the middle class as a proportion of the population in 2005 ranged from 
7 percent in Honduras to 33 percent in Chile; the proportion of total income commanded by the 
middle class ranged from 14 to 42 percent (in 2005, middle class size in the United States and 
Sweden were 91 and 95 percent, respectively, and their shares of income were 81 and 88 percent, 
respectively). 
Three countries in the region showed the largest increases in the global middle class by the 
two measures between 1990 and 2005: Brazil, Chile and Mexico -- two social democratic regimes 
and one non-left regime, consistent with the inequality declines in those countries noted above.  Our 
analysis of changes in quintile share per capita growth elasticities by political regime in almost the    
 
same period (see Appendix Table A-3) indicates that in the social democratic regimes where the 
middle class grew, it grew despite the fourth and fifth quintiles capturing much less of the benefits 
of growth (indeed the fifth or richest quintile’s elasticity of per capita growth to overall growth is 
negative) than did the lower three quintiles.  Incomes at the top of the distribution (which are 
absolutely higher to start with) grew far less than incomes at the bottom in these social democratic 
regimes – and more so than in the populist left regimes.  But they did grow, so that more people 
crossed beyond the $10 per day line and entered the middle class, as overall incomes rose in those 
countries.
31   
Meanwhile two left populist countries by 2005 had suffered absolute declines in the size of 
their middle classes by 2005: Venezuela (where the middle class fell from 21 to 3 percent of the 
population, and its proportion of income from 35 to 8 percent) and urban Argentina (survey in 
Argentina covered urban areas only) where the middle class fell from 39 to 31 percent and its 
proportion of income from 53 to 46 percent).  The declines in inequality reported for those 
countries by 2008 are likely to be associated with declines in income overall, and relatively greater 
declines in the incomes of households in the top two “middle-income” quintiles, where the middle 
class (by the $10 per day definition) is concentrated.
32  
Might the growing middle classes in countries like Chile and Brazil help lock in leftist social 
democratic political regimes (whether because or despite its concentration in the top quintile of 
households)?  There is no evidence that a large middle class is necessary let alone sufficient to these 
regimes.  But a growing global middle class does seem likely to reinforce effective government that 
manages moderate redistribution while retaining investor confidence in the likelihood of continuing 
growth and price stability.  
Put another way: When is the middle class large enough to become politically salient in 
supporting or at least tolerating the kind of social and other distributive policies that are good for 
them but turn out to be good for the poor—for example universal public education?  When is the 
middle class status’ potentially attainable to the median voter so that he or she votes for the regime 
type that represents “middle class” interests? The numbers above, which say nothing about the 
causal effect of a large middle class size on the type of political regime, suggest the answer in Latin 
America is not yet but getting close in Chile and Mexico, and possibly in Brazil as well.  At the same 
time, considering causality in the other direction, it does appear that social democratic regimes are 
good for growing the middle class – as growth itself increases household income in the third and 
fourth quintiles – and politics permits that relatively more of the benefits of that growth are shared 
at the bottom of the distribution.  
Conclusion: Some politics, some economics 
                                                             
31 In a country like Brazil, by this definition (a minimum of $10 per day per capita), all members of the middle class were 
in the top quintile. With overall growth, households in the fourth quintile moved over the $10 day line into the middle 
class. 
32  Because the middle class defined in Birdsall, 2010 is not the middle stratum it is possible to have a growing middle 
class and increasing inequality -- the case for Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador between 1990 and 2005 -- , and similarly to 
have a declining middle class and declining inequality.      
 
Countries of all political stripes in Latin America enjoyed a reduction in inequality in the 
2000s. Nonetheless, the region continues to be the most unequal one in the world, and while in the 
last decade social policy became more pro-poor, in most countries public spending continues to be 
neutral or regressive.   
In this paper we show that there is more to the story, however. In some countries the 
politics of redistributive policy appears to be changing in a fundamental way, suggesting that in those 
countries at least the recent declines in inequality are likely to stick.   
On the basis of our econometric analysis and our comparison of governance and other 
characteristics, we conclude that in the social democratic regimes at least (but not in the populist 
regimes), the inequality decline is the outcome of what might be called a structural change. In 
contrast, in the populist regimes our evidence indicates that the declines in inequality have been due 
more to good luck than to good policy; that in Argentina and Venezuela  inequality levels fell from 
levels higher than they had been historically is consistent with the good luck explanation.   
Our conclusion rests primarily on the evidence that the economic policies and programs of 
social democratic regimes have been clearly redistributive – perhaps because they have some 
political logic in open and growing economies reliant on and benefiting a growing middle class. In 
terms of broadly defined economic conditions in the 2000s, the difference between the two types of 
leftist regimes were not all that great.  Over the period 1990-2008 both types of leftist regimes had, 
not surprisingly, higher government expenditures (as a percent of GDP) than non-leftist regimes 
(and the social democratic regimes actually had higher overall government expenditures than the 
populist regimes).  They also had lower inflation and higher social spending as a percent of GDP 
(than populist and non-left regimes), though not markedly so.    
At the same time, controlling for differences in economic policies and characteristics, the 
social democratic regimes were more effective in designing and managing social policies that were 
more redistributive to the poorest groups, while maintaining good – indeed somewhat better – 
macroeconomic programs than the populist left regimes and indeed than the non-left regimes.  They 
delivered the right combination of healthy growth, macroeconomic stability and social policies 
(including increased social spending and higher minimum wages as well as cash transfer programs 
for the poor), building on a foundation of increased education.  In those countries, growth benefited 
most the bottom three quintiles, partly because high social spending was highly redistributive.  At 
the same time, with rapid economic growth overall, the incomes of the top quintiles continued to 
grow in absolute terms, increasing the size and share of income of households in the middle class, 
i.e. enjoying income of at least $10 a day. In the social democratic regimes, it appears to have been 
more attractive politically to deliver a combination of low inflation and social programs and 
spending targeted to the poor.   
In short, what  might be called a new redistributive politics in Brazil and Chile compared to 
Argentina and Venezuela is what distinguishes the two types of leftist regimes.      
 
In those settings, if those “politics” continue,
33 inequality declines are likely to be sustained 
in the future – a good thing given that their levels of inequality are still high. For the more populist 
political regimes, we are less confident.  Whether because of or independent of their political 
characteristics, their macroeconomic  policies are beginning to deteriorate, and their  institutions are 
viewed as delivering government that is less “effective” than are the social democratic governments. 
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Figure 1: Change in Gini Coefficients for Latin America: 2000-2008 
  
Source: updated from Lopez-Calva, Lustig and Ortiz (2011). Based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank), 
August 2010 (http://sedlac.eco....unlp.edu.ar/eng/) 
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Data for Argentina and Uruguay are forurban areas only. In Uruguay, urban areas covered by the survey represent 80 percent ofthe totalpopulation; in Argentina, they represent
66 percent. The average change in the Gini foreach country is calculated as the percentage change between the end year and the initial year divided by the number of years; the
average for the totalis the simple average ofthe changes by country (thirteen countries in which inequality fell). The years used to estimate the percentage change are as follows:
Argentina (2008-00), Bolivia (2007-01), Brazil (2008-01), Chile (2006-00), Costa Rica (2008-01), Dominican Republic (2008-00), Ecuador (2008-03), El Salvador (2008-00), Guatemala
(2006-00),Honduras (2007-01), Mexico (2008-00),Nicaragua (2005-01),Panama (2006-01),Paraguay (2008-02),Peru (2008-01),Uruguay (2008-00), and Venezuela (2006-00). Using the
bootstrap method, with a 95 percent significance level, the changes were not found to be statistically significant for the following countries:Bolivia and Guatemala (represented by
grid bars in the figure). The years used in non-Latin American countries are as follows:China (1993-Mid 00s), India (1993-Mid 00s), South Africa (1993-08), and OECD-30 (Mid 80s-
Mid 00s).   
 
Figure 2: Gini coefficients for countries around the world  
 
Source: Gasparini and Lustig (2010).  
Note: Each bar represents the Gini coefficient for the distribution of household per capita income in a given country 
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Figure 3: Comparison of 90% Gini vs. total Gini in Latin America 
 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (1999).  
Note: From IDB calculations based on household surveys.  
 
Figure 4:  The Education Gap 
 
Source: Barro and Lee (2010) available at http://www.barrolee.com/. The East Asia group excludes small island 
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Figure 5: Inequality in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela (Gini coefficients, rounded) 
 
Source: McLeod and Lustig (2010).  
 
Figure 6: Annual income redistribution by quintile (cumulative years in office  
starting in year 2) 
 




                 







                    
           
  
                                                                       
                                                      
                             
                                
     
           
   
      
           
    
    
     
                                                                
                                                                                                          
                                                                          
                          
                                  
 
Figure 7: Latin American public spending on social programs as % of GDP (education, 
health, and transfers) 
 
Source: McLeod and Lustig (2010).   
Figure 8: Redistributive impact of changes in social spending budget share by quintile 
(change significant at *5% or **1% level) 
 









     
  
   
     
                                                                            
                                                                      
                                                              
                                                    
                                                   
                              
                                  
     
             
    
      
         
           
    
                 
    
     
                                                         
                                                           
                                                               
                                                                  
                 
             
        
    
 
Figure 9: Government Effectiveness by political regime types (2000-2007)  
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) 
Figure 10: Average Terms of Trade (2002-2006)   
 
 
   
     
  
    
  
    
                             
     
             
         
             
           
       
           
       
       
           
      
         
       
         
     
       
   
   
       
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
       
                                  
                                      
                                         
            
                   
                                   
 
Figure 11: Change in Middle Class Size (proportion of population) between 1990 and 2005 
  
Source: Birdsall (2010) 
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
     
    
   
   
   
         
    
    
    
    
         
    
   
    
    
         
    
   
         
         
              
 
Table 1:  New Left Political Regimes in Latin America 
              
Cumulative years 
regime is in power* 











Argentina  The Kirchners  May-03  2004  Left Populist  0  2  5 
Bolivia  Evo Morales  Jan-06  2007  Left Populist  0  0  2 
Brazil  Lula da Silva  Jan-03  2004 
Social 
Democratic 
0  2  5 
Chile  Ricardo Lagos  Mar-00  2001 
Social 
Democratic 
2  5  8 
Ecuador  Rafael Correa  Jan-07  2008  Left Populist  0  0  1 




Mar-05  2006 
Social 
Democratic 
0  0  3 
Venezuela  Hugo Chavez  Feb-99  2000  Left Populist  3  6  9 
Total effective years        5  15  34 
Source: McLeod and Lustig (2010). 
*’Effective year” is one year after the government takes office, as new policies take time to implement.  Both 
Nicaragua and Ecuador elected left populist governments in 2008, outside the window of the present 
analysis. 
1/ This table begins with the political regime classification discussed in Arnson and Perales (2007).  After 
2007 left populist governments took office in Ecuador (Rafael Correa) and Nicaragua (Daniel Ortega).  As 
Acemoglu et al. (2010, p. 1) notes the “resurgence of populist politicians in many developing countries, 
especially in Latin America.  Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Kirchners in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, 
Alan Garcia in Peru, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are examples of politicians that “use the rhetoric of 
aggressively defending the interests of the common man against the privileged elite.”  Unfortunately, 
Nicaragua could not be included among the left populist countries in the regression analysis because its data 
end in 2006. 
     
 
Table 2: Determinants of Latin American Inequality 1990-2008 
(as measured by the Gini coefficient, including fixed effects) 
 
 
Source: Lustig and McLeod (2009) 
    
 
Table A-1: Key Economic Indicators by Political Regime: 1988-2009 (3 year averages) 
  
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
     
         
                              
   
   Social Democratic                                        
   Left Populist                                    
   Other Latam                                        
                                 
   Social Democratic                                           
   Left Populist                                            
   Other Latam                                          
                                   
   Social Democratic                                        
   Left Populist                                    
   Other Latam                                     
                                                           
   Social Democratic                                
   Left Populist                                
   Other Latam                            
                                            
   
   Social Democratic                                
   Left Populist                              
   Other Latam                               
                                          
   Social Democratic                                
   Left Populist                             
   Other Latam                               
                                                   
   Brazil & Chile                             
   Argentina & Venezuela                             
                                        
   Brazil & Chile                                          
   Argentina & Venezuela                                   
                                 
   Brazil & Chile                                       
   Argentina & Venezuela                                         
1/ Social spending is not available for Bolivia, Venezuela or Ecuador in 2007 or 2008 so the 2006      
     value is used for the 2006-08 period.  Most other CEPAL social spending estimates end in 2008.     
2/ Changes in CPI are as reported by the IMF, WEO October 2010 database, except for 2007 to 
2009     
     Argentina inflation for which are based on higher FIEL (not official INDEC) estimates.        
     
 
Table A-2: Changes in Quintile Share by Political Regime 
 
Table A-2: Changes in quintile shares by Political Regime 
Dependent Variable: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q4* Gini
Quintile share and Gini A-2.1 A-2.2 A-2.3 A-2.4 A-2.5 A-2.4a A-2.6
Left-Populist Regime  -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.08 -0.11 0.04 -0.05
 cumulative years in power -(0.3) -(1.6) (1.2) (1.9) -(0.7) (1.1) -(0.2)
Social Democratic Regime  0.09 0.13 0.14 0.03 -0.41 0.10 -0.42
 cumulative years in power (7.6) (2.9) (3.8) (0.7) -(4.4) (2.8) -(4.3)
Initial income share or Gini 0.61 0.76 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.70
(4.2) (6.1) (7.9) (9.1) (7.1) (7.4)
Constant 1.25 1.7 3.8 6.0 19 20 16
(t-statistics in parentheses) (2.4) (1.7) (3.7) (3.9) (3.4) (2.7) (3.3)
Estimation method RE RE RE RE RE FE RE
Number of Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Number of Countries 1/ 17 17 17 17 17 17 18
Weighted adjusted R
2 0.18 0.29 0.40 0.55 0.49 0.49 0.35
Unweighted  R
2   0.45 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.33
Std Error of Regression  0.50 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.72 0.72 2.31
Mean dependent variable  3.4 7.2 12 20 57 20 52
Hausman test prob value 0.92 0.33 0.36 0.02 0.49 0.87
*The null of unbiased random effects estimates is rejected for quintile 4 at the 2% 
  significance level, equation A-2.4a provides unbiased fixed effects estimates.
1/ The quintile regressions exclude Uruguay, but the Gini equation A-2.6 includes
     Uruguay.  Including Uruguay does not substantially alter the quintile results. 
Cumultive political regime years
Quintile shares   
 
Table A-3: Change in Quintile Shares, Random Effects Estimates 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Gini Gini
A-3.1 A-3.2 A-3.3 A-3.4 A-3.5 A-3.6 A-3.7
Left-Populist Regime  0.26 0.21 0.49 0.44 -1.5 -1.7 -2.2
(1.1) (0.8) (2.0) (1.9) -(1.8) -(1.7) -(2.3)
Social Democratic Regime  0.59 0.81 0.83 0.08 -2.6 -3.1 -3.1
(3.7) (4.2) (3.7) (0.4) -(3.5) -(3.6) -(4.3)
Non-left regimes 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.16 -1.2 -1.5 -2.2
(1.9) (2.1) (2.7) (1.7) -(2.4) -(2.3) -(3.9)
Initial income share/Gini 0.56 0.72 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.57
(3.5) (5.4) (6.8) (8.7) (6.1) (5.1) (4.5)
Inflation 1.2
(3.2)
Constant 1.2 1.7 4.0 6.4 22 23 25
(t-statistics in parentheses) (2.1) (1.7) (3.6) (4.2) (3.7) (3.6) 3.6
Estimation method RE RE RE RE RE FE RE
Number of Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Number of Countries 1/ 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Weighted adjusted R
2 0.19 0.29 0.39 0.52 0.34 0.28 0.28
Unweighted  R
2   0.47 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.60
Std Error of Regression  0.49 0.55 0.60 0.73 2.06 2.30 2.26
Mean dependent variable  3.4 7.2 12.2 19.8 57 52 52
Social spending as a share of total government consumption
Table A-3: Changes in quintile shares, random effects estimates
Quintile shares